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HUNTING AND POSTING  
ON PRIVATE LAND IN AMERICA 
MARK R. SIGMON 
INTRODUCTION 
Rod Froelich, owner of seventy-five hundred acres in Sioux 
County, North Dakota, was tired of having hunters enter his land to 
hunt without his permission. Froelich had not posted “no hunting” 
signs on his land, which under the common reading of the state’s 
posting statute meant that hunters were not obligated to seek his 
permission to hunt.1 As a member of the North Dakota House of 
Representatives, he sponsored legislation that would have required 
hunters to get permission from landowners before hunting on private 
land.2 When the legislation failed, Froelich, with the support of the 
North Dakota Stockmen’s Association3 and the North Dakota Farm 
Bureau,4 sued the governor and the director of the Game and Fish 
Department of North Dakota, seeking a declaratory judgment that 
hunters must have landowner permission before hunting on private 
land.5 In moving for summary judgment, Froelich argued that the 
posting statute, which provided for a criminal penalty if a hunter 
entered posted land, did not abrogate his common law right to 
exclude and his civil trespass remedy to enforce that right on 
unposted land.6 He further argued that if the statute was interpreted 
to effect such an abrogation—which was the common reading—it 
 
Copyright © 2004 by Mark R. Sigmon. 
 1. N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-18 (2002); see also infra note 58 (detailing other state  
posting statutes). 
 2. H.R. 1278, 57th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2001); Dale Wetzel, Suit Seeks to Bar 
Hunters from Unposted Private Land, BISMARCK TRIB. (North Dakota), May 28, 2003, at C6. 
 3. Press Release, North Dakota Stockmen’s Association, Stockmen’s Association 
Supports Trespass Lawsuit (July 15, 2003), available at http://www.ndstockmen.org/ 
images/Trespasslawsuit.htm. 
 4. Press Release, North Dakota Farm Bureau, NDFB 2004 Priority Issues (Jan. 29, 2004) 
(on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 5. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4–5, Froelich v. Hoeven, No. 03-C-
0709 (Sioux County, N.D. filed May 21, 2003).  
 6. Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 1–3, 
Froelich (No. 03-C-0709) [hereinafter Froelich Brief]. 
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would amount to an unconstitutional taking.7 In reply, the defendants 
simply relied on the existence and history of the posting statute to 
support their position that the public could hunt on unposted land 
without permission, free from any civil or criminal sanction.8 They 
further stated in a newspaper article that, “The assumption that 
unposted land is open for hunting has been the case for decades, if 
not since statehood.”9 The court deemed Froelich’s complaint a 
request for an improper advisory opinion and granted summary 
judgment for the defendants, declining to reach the merits of the 
case.10 
The year before Froelich filed his suit, an Arizona landowner 
mounted a similar protest before an Arizona House of 
Representatives committee,11 lobbying in support of a bill to repeal 
Arizona’s recently enacted posting statute.12 Although agreeing that 
the statute clearly abrogated a landowner’s civil trespass remedy 
against people hunting on unposted land, she argued that it unfairly 
undermined private property rights.13 In hearings before the 
committee, she stated that proper posting under the statute was 
difficult if not impossible, that some hunters knock down “no 
hunting” posts, that hunters were often dangerous, and that, in the 
end, the state’s posting law was simply inimical to private property 
rights.14 Three other landowners testified similarly.15 Members of the 
Arizona Game and Fish Commission, the Arizona Wildlife 
Federation, and the National Rifle Association argued in response 
that the posting law was a reasonable “compromise” between the 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or Alternative 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 5–7, Froelich (No. 03-C-0709) [hereinafter North Dakota 
Brief]; see id. at 15–16, 18–19 (arguing that the legislative adoption of the posting statutes at 
issue excludes the operation of any common law principles and that the courts have no authority 
to rewrite the statutes). 
 9. Wetzel, supra note 2.  
 10. Froelich, No. 03-C-0709, slip op. at 4 (Sioux County, N.D. May 3, 2004).  
 11. Hunters Trespassing: Hearing on H.B. 2592 Before the House Comm. on Military, 
Veterans Affairs, and Aviation, 45th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2002) [hereinafter Hearing], available 
at http://www.azleg.state.az.us/legtext/45leg/2r/comm_min/house/0321mvaa.doc.htm. 
 12. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-304 (West Supp. 2004). 
 13. Hearing, supra note 11 (statement of Anna Marsob). 
 14. Id. (statement of Anna Marsob). 
 15. Id. (statements of Nancy Laizure, Paul Oiefenderfer, and Judith Heauser). 
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rights of hunters and landowners.16 After a lively debate, the bill 
failed.17 
 These two conflicts revolve around state posting statutes—
statutes that require private landowners desiring to exclude hunters 
from their land to post “no hunting” signs. As an initial matter, as this 
Note later shows, Froelich’s argument that the statutes are only 
criminal and therefore do not affect landowners’ civil remedies is 
unavailing—the posting statutes actually make hunting on unposted 
land perfectly “legal.” In this way, the statutes sacrifice the rights of 
landowners for the sake of hunting, a sacrifice that seems increasingly 
unreasonable as society changes. For this reason, states or 
municipalities should eliminate or significantly change these statutes. 
Part I of this Note analyzes the history behind the statutes, from 
medieval English hunting laws to the rise of American statutes 
designed to ensure that everyone, not just the rich and landed, could 
hunt. Part II catalogues the current statutes, discussing the variations 
among them and how secondary sources characterize the balance of 
rights between hunters and landowners. Part III notes several 
problems with the current statutes; specifically, it recognizes the 
inherent conflict that the statutes create between the rights of hunters 
and landowners and analyzes landowners’ compelling, but likely 
unsuccessful, legal arguments against the statutes. Part III then 
describes certain changes in society since the posting statutes were 
first conceived and explains how those changes may undermine both 
the statutes’ rationale and their intended effects. Part IV suggests 
that, because judicial remedies seem unlikely, state legislatures or 
municipalities in the twenty-nine states with posting requirements 
should change their statutes (or common law requirements18) to 
require explicit landowner permission to hunt on private land, as 
twenty-one states already do. Failing the adoption of such a 
requirement, Part IV suggests several alternative improvements to 
the posting statutes. 
 
 16. Id. (statements of Hays Gilstrop, Ariz. Game & Fish Comm’n; Joe Carter, Ariz. Game 
& Fish Comm’n; Darren LaSorte, Nat’l Rifle Ass’n; and Jack Simon, Ariz. Wildlife Fed’n). 
 17. See id. (noting that the bill failed by a roll-call vote of 0-8-0-2). 
 18. See infra note 67 and accompanying text (explaining that the common law posting 
requirements of Maine and Louisiana are similar to the statutory posting requirements of 
twenty-seven other states). 
SIGMON FINAL.DOC 6/6/2005 10:38 AM 
552 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:549 
I.  THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO HUNT ON PRIVATE LAND IN 
AMERICA 
A. The English Law as It Arrived in Colonial America 
In England, before and during the era of the American colonies, 
hunting and trapping19 were rights reserved for members of the 
wealthy, and usually landed, class.20 In 1389, hunting was 
characterized as a “gentleman’s game,”21 and eventually a scheme of 
qualification statutes arose to grant only leading citizens the right to 
hunt.22 These qualification statutes were not justified on the theory 
that only landowners were entitled to the game on their land, for 
some statutes qualified prominent citizens regardless of whether they 
owned any land.23 Rather, the statutes were explicitly justified—at 
least in part—on the rationale that hunting was an “amusing 
diversion” that kept members of the lower class from pursuing more 
important work.24 Parliament was “[d]eaf to the plea that game might 
nourish the poor,” and the English game laws “ensured that the poor 
 
 19. Unless this Note states explicitly that it is dealing with only hunting or trapping, it will 
discuss both under the general term “hunting.” American law generally treats hunting and 
trapping similarly, whereas fishing laws are often of a different nature. See RUTH S. MUSGRAVE 
& MARY ANNE STEIN, STATE WILDLIFE LAWS HANDBOOK 47–720 (1993) (describing the 
hunting, trapping, and fishing laws of all fifty states). But see infra notes 75–76 and 
accompanying text (discussing statutes that treat hunting and trapping differently). This Note 
does not treat the vast, complex array of fishing laws. 
 20. See THOMAS A. LUND, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAW 8–10, 19 (1980) (noting that a goal 
of early English wildlife regulation was to secure “unequal distribution of the right to utilize 
wildlife,” that early English game law aimed “to beggar the powerless,” and that “landed wealth 
and high social standing” were requirements for hunters). Professor Lund’s book—based in part 
on his articles British Wildlife Law Before the American Revolution: Lessons from the Past, 74 
MICH. L. REV. 49 (1975), and Early American Wildlife Law, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703 (1976)—
provides a detailed history of American game law and is the source upon which Part I draws 
heavily. 
 21. 13 Rich. 2, c. 13, § 1 (1389) (Eng.); LUND, supra note 20, at 8. 
 22. See LUND, supra note 20, at 8 (“[Q]ualification statutes allowed only prominent citizens 
to take game, to possess certain weapons and, ultimately, to eat certain animals.”). The statutes 
often required hunters to have a certain level of wealth or a hereditary title to hunt. Id. 
Eventually, in 1831, the qualification statutes were abandoned in favor of a new statute 
permitting all people who purchased licenses to hunt on their own land or on the land of others 
with permission from the owners. Game Act, 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 32, §§ 1, 6 (1831) (Eng.). 
 23. LUND, supra note 20, at 10 & n.58 (citing 1 Jam., c. 27, § 2 (1604) (Eng.), which allowed 
hunting by persons of “higher degree”). In addition, some “owners of properties worth less than 
the statutory amount who were equally subject to wildlife depredations were not qualified to kill 
the damaging animals.” Id. at 10. 
 24. Id. 
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could neither consume game, nor interfere with the beasts that 
ravaged their crops.”25 
 Although the qualification statutes were not based on the theory 
that solely landowners were entitled to game on their private land, in 
eighteenth-century England an academic debate raged regarding 
whether, nonetheless, there was truth to this theory. Railing against 
this view, Blackstone argued that the landed had no inherent right to 
the game on their land; he argued that whatever right the landed had 
to take game on their own land was based on royal grants and that the 
“right of taking and destroying game belongs exclusively to the 
king.”26 As such, Blackstone believed that the sovereign could confer 
upon (or deny to) anyone, rich or poor, the right to take game27—a 
theory that came to be called “free taking.”28 This is not to say that 
Blackstone denied that landowners could exclude hunters as 
trespassers;29 Blackstone simply believed that title to ferae naturae was 
vested in the sovereign, not the landowner, and thus that the 
sovereign had discretion to restrict or control hunting.30 On the other 
side of the debate was Professor Edward Christian, an editor of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries.31 Christian argued that, although the king 
could travel wherever he wished, he had no more right to the game on 
a citizen’s land than to the crops on that land.32 Professor Christian, 
then, believed that landowners had the exclusive right to the game on 
their land. 
 
 25. Id. at 19. 
 26. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *417; LUND, supra note 20, at 21. 
 27. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *417–18. 
 28. LUND, supra note 20, at 20–21. 
 29. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *411 (noting that English law allowed restraints 
on hunting, one common restraint being a general prohibition against “entering on another 
man’s grounds, for any cause, without the owner’s leave”); see also 3 id. at *209–10: 
Every unwarrantable entry on another’s soil the law entitles a trespass by breaking his 
close . . . . For every man’s land is in the eye of the law enclosed and set apart from his 
neighbor’s: and that either by a visible and material fence . . . or, by an ideal invisible 
boundary, existing only in the contemplation of the law . . . . 
LUND, supra note 20, at 23 (explaining that, according to Blackstone, “the civil law denied the 
landowner’s property interest in wildlife” and, as such, “trespassers acquired good title to the 
animals they poached” (emphasis added)). 
 30. See LUND, supra note 20, at 22 (“The power to make [grants to take game] . . . 
established the king’s right as exclusive; had it been otherwise, . . . the landowner grantees 
would have antecedently enjoyed the rights the king appeared to bestow.”). 
 31. See id. at 21 (stating that Blackstone’s support for “free taking” and Professor 
Christian’s support for the “landed’s authority” placed them at opposite ends of the spectrum in 
the English debate about the “landed’s claim to wildlife”). 
 32. Id. at 22. 
SIGMON FINAL.DOC 6/6/2005 10:38 AM 
554 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:549 
B. The American Reaction 
Had Professor Christian’s theory prevailed in America, 
landowners could have excluded hunters from their land simply by 
claiming a property right in the animals themselves. But it was 
Blackstone’s theory that prevailed in the new colonies, where 
geography made “free taking” the “logical policy.”33 Unlike in 
England, there was little danger that wildlife would be overharvested. 
In addition, game was arguably more necessary for early Americans 
than it was for their English counterparts because rural America, with 
its frontier, required more of a subsistence lifestyle. To the extent that 
wild animals impeded farming, which occupied a greater portion of 
land in the colonies than in England, it was more necessary to control 
the population of certain animals.34 Thus, free taking—encompassing 
the idea that landowners did not own the game on their land, but not 
the idea that landowners were powerless to exclude trespassers—took 
hold. 
To exclude hunters from their private land, landowners initially 
offered two arguments consistent with the theory of free taking. The 
first argument was that their right to wildlife was based not merely on 
their titles to land, but on royal grants of exclusive hunting rights.35 
Early American courts countered this argument by distinguishing 
sovereign rights from property rights, reasoning that sovereign rights 
“inhered indefeasibly in the powers of government.”36 The courts 
further characterized the conveyance of such rights over game to give 
landowners only the powers of a trustee, with the benefit of wildlife 
accruing to all citizens. Such powers were inalienable, so the authority 
over wildlife remained vested in the government.37 The second 
 
 33. Id. at 20. 
 34. See id. at 19 (stating that colonial policies controlling the hunting of wildlife sought to 
produce “a sustained yield of game” and “to serve agriculture by exterminating vermin”). 
 35. Id. at 25; see, e.g., First Grant to the Duke of York (1664), reprinted in 1 COLONIAL 
LAWS OF NEW YORK 1 (Albany, N.Y., James Lyon 1896) (providing an example of such a 
grant); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 4–8 (1821) (summarizing, then rejecting, plaintiff’s 
argument that state regulation of hunting and fishing in a tidal area was improper in light of a 
royal grant of hunting rights to the plaintiff). 
 36. LUND, supra note 20, at 26. 
 37. Id.; Mundy, 6 N.J.L. at 71–73, 77 (explaining that the title to “common property [wild 
beasts]” is “still, though this title, strictly speaking . . . in the sovereign, yet the use is common to 
all the people”). This theory later became known as the “state ownership doctrine.” See Hughes 
v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336–39 (1979) (reaffirming the states’ power over wildlife on 
grounds other than the state ownership doctrine and noting that the state ownership doctrine 
had been “eroded to the point of virtual extinction”); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 527–28 
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argument, aimed at excluding nonlandowning hunters, was that 
landowners possessed status privileges similar to those exemplified by 
the English qualification laws.38 This argument was easier to 
overcome: early American courts simply rejected the idea as being 
un-American.39  
Notwithstanding the two developments described above, private 
landowners could still have excluded hunters simply by claiming that 
hunters were trespassers. Because the theory of free taking did not 
encompass the idea that hunters had the right to enter private land,40 
American lawmakers, to ensure that hunting was available to 
everyone, set about creating this new American right. It had its 
beginnings in seventeenth-century laws that allowed New Englanders 
to cross undeveloped private land41 to fish or hunt fowl on public 
lakes.42 Such laws, however, only ensured that hunters could enter 
undeveloped private land, not that hunters could actually take game 
on such land. Early American lawmakers then turned their attention 
to ensuring that hunters could do the latter.43 Through the use of 
 
(1896) (giving a general description of the state ownership doctrine and the wide latitude of the 
states to regulate hunting). But see John D. Echeverria & Julie Lurman, “Perfectly Astounding” 
Public Rights: Wildlife Protection and the Takings Clause, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 365–68 
(2003) (reconciling Geer with Hughes, and concluding that the state ownership doctrine is still 
alive and well). 
 38. See LUND, supra note 20, at 26 (“Had the English qualification tests been considered 
appropriate to American law, a hunting monopoly for the landed might have been established.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 39. Id.; see Johnson v. Patterson, 14 Conn. 1, 5 (1840) (holding that such English privileges 
were inconsistent with the spirit of this country’s institutions); Hallock v. Dominy, 14 N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 52, 55 (1876) (same). Despite this ideal, some American states did enact variations on the 
English qualification laws. See LUND, supra note 20, at 26 (mentioning Virginia and 
Pennsylvania laws that required a certain level of slave ownership or land ownership, 
respectively, for particular hunting rights). 
 40. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (explaining that Blackstone’s “free taking” 
theory did not always insulate hunters from the offense of trespassing). 
 41. In early America, the law preferred agriculture over hunting. LUND, supra note 20, at 
24. As a result, “[d]eveloped lands were spared [the incursions of hunters].” Id. Thus, the right 
of hunters to cross private land to access public land was often limited to unenclosed or 
undeveloped private land. See also infra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining that nine of 
the current state posting statutes require posting only for undeveloped or unenclosed land). The 
posting statutes and this Note use the terms “undeveloped” and “unenclosed” interchangeably. 
 42. Book of the General Lawes and Libertyes (1660), reprinted in COLONIAL LAWS OF 
MASSACHUSETTS 170 (William H. Whitmore ed., Boston, Rockwell & Churchill 1889); LUND, 
supra note 20, at 24. 
 43. See LUND, supra note 20, at 25 (stating that early legislation “affirmed only the right to 
enter unenclosed private lands, not to hunt on them,” and that “[t]he next step would be to seek 
the right to take the game as well”). 
SIGMON FINAL.DOC 6/6/2005 10:38 AM 
556 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:549 
constitutional conventions, court decisions, and legislation, such a 
right was born.  
Strong advocates of hunting actually argued that the United 
States Constitution should protect the right of citizens to enter onto 
unenclosed land to hunt.44 Although that effort was clearly 
unsuccessful, the citizens of two states—Pennsylvania and Vermont—
ratified constitutions recognizing and protecting such a right.45 Indeed, 
in Pennsylvania, an earlier document from 1696 recognized the right.46 
The Vermont constitutional provision still exists, providing: “The 
inhabitants of this State shall have liberty in seasonable times, to hunt 
and fowl on the lands they hold, and on other lands not inclosed, and 
in like manner to fish in all boatable and other waters (not private 
property) under proper regulations . . . .”47 The Supreme Court of 
Vermont has recognized that Vermont’s constitutional provision 
changed the English law by “extend[ing] rights to citizens which the 
common law had not recognized” and by “recogniz[ing] rights to hunt 
and fish . . . in what had previously been the landowner’s private 
domain.”48 
 
 44. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania 
to Their Constituents, PA. PACKET & DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 3 
HERBERT J. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 145, 151 (1981); LUND, supra note 
20, at 25. 
 45. See PA. CONST. of 1776, § 43 (“The inhabitants of this state shall have liberty to fowl 
and hunt in seasonable times on the lands they hold, and on all other lands therein not inclosed; 
and in like manner to fish in all boatable waters, and others not private property.”); VT. CONST. 
of 1777, § 39 (“That the inhabitants of this State, shall have liberty to hunt and fowl, in 
seasonable times, on the lands they hold, and on other lands (not enclosed;) [sic] and, in like 
manner, to fish in all boatable and other waters, not private property . . . .”). Pennsylvania 
ratified a new constitution in 1790 that did not include any such provision; Vermont’s provision 
still exists, located at Section 67 of the Vermont Constitution. Note that both Pennsylvania and 
Vermont are currently states in which landowners must post to exclude hunters from their land. 
See discussion infra notes 58, 62–63 and accompanying text. 
 46. See FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (1696), reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, 
TERRITORIES, OR COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 3070, 3075 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909): 
That the inhabitants of this province and territories thereof, shall have liberty to fish 
and hunt, upon the lands they hold, or all other lands therein, not inclosed, and to fish 
in all waters in the said lands . . . in and belonging to this province and territories 
thereof, with liberty to draw his, or their fish upon any man’s land, so as it be not to 
the detriment or annoyance of the owner thereof . . . . 
 47. VT. CONST. § 67; see Cabot v. Thomas, 514 A.2d 1034, 1037–38 (Vt. 1986) (describing 
and applying the constitutional provision); New England Trout & Salmon Club v. Mather, 35 A. 
323, 328 (Vt. 1896) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (describing the history of the provision). 
 48. Cabot, 514 A.2d at 1037–38. 
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Even in states without constitutional provisions protecting the 
right to hunt on unenclosed land, early state courts recognized this 
right. In an early South Carolina case,49 the court held that “[t]he 
hunting of wild animals in the forests, and unenclosed lands of this 
country, is as ancient as its settlement, [and] the right to do so coeval 
therewith; [and] the owner of the soil, while his lands are unenclosed, 
can not prohibit the exercise of it to others.”50 Contrary to the law as 
it exists generally today,51 this South Carolina court held not only that 
there was a presumption that unenclosed land was open to hunters 
but further that landowners could not even exclude hunters once they 
discovered their presence.52 The Supreme Court of the United States, 
in McKee v. Gratz,53 also recognized a presumption in American law 
that unenclosed land was open to hunters: 
The strict rule of the English common law as to entry upon a close 
must be taken to be mitigated by common understanding with 
regard to the large expanses of unenclosed and uncultivated land in 
many parts at least of this country. Over these it is customary to 
wander, shoot and fish at will until the owner sees fit to prohibit it. 
A license may be implied from the habits of the country.54 
 
 49. M’Conico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244, 244 (1818). 
 50. Id. Although “the decision was subsequently explained as either an imprecise 
treatment of trespass without injury, or as a judicial effort to steer clear of a ‘sea of petty 
litigation,’ the court did not shrink from the view that an owner had to enclose his property to 
exclude hunters.” LUND, supra note 20, at 25 (footnotes omitted). 
 51. See infra Part II.A (describing the posting statutes). 
 52. M’Conico, 9 S.C.L. at 246: 
Having come to the conclusion, that it is the right of the inhabitants to hunt on 
unenclosed lands, I need not attempt to prove that the dissent or disapprobation of 
the owner cannot deprive him of it; for I am sure it never yet entered the mind of any 
man, that a right which the law gives, can be defeated at the mere will and caprice of 
an individual. 
 53. 260 U.S. 127 (1922). 
 54. Id. at 136. Justice Thurgood Marshall reaffirmed this view more than sixty years later in 
a portion of his dissent agreeing with the majority in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984): 
Still other spaces are, by positive law and social convention, presumed accessible to 
members of the public unless the owner manifests his intention to exclude them. 
  Undeveloped land falls into the last-mentioned category. If a person has not 
marked the boundaries of his fields or woods in a way that informs passersby that 
they are not welcome, he cannot object if members of the public enter onto the 
property. 
Id. at 193–94 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Oliver, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the “open 
fields” doctrine of its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a doctrine whereby governmental 
investigation of certain undeveloped land is generally not considered a “search” for Fourth 
Amendment purposes. Id. at 184. 
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McKee is an instructive case because in it the Court recognized that 
American law had changed from the English common law. The Court 
held that, because of the differences between the two nations, a 
different presumption had taken hold in America—that unenclosed 
land was presumed open to hunters. 
In addition to these constitutional and judicial approaches, a 
third method used to ensure hunters’ access to private land was the 
enactment of posting statutes forcing landowners to post signs that 
hunting was not permitted.55 These statutes fostered the presumption 
that private land was open to hunters and required affirmative acts on 
the part of landowners to exclude hunters. Such statutes are currently 
the primary source of hunters’ right to hunt on private land in almost 
every state that recognizes such a right. The following Part examines 
these statutes in detail. 
II.  THE CURRENT LAW OF HUNTING  
ON PRIVATE LAND IN AMERICA 
A. The Posting Statutes 
The current state of American hunting law reflects the history of 
the right to hunt in this nation. Most states now have statutes 
requiring landowners to post their land to exclude hunters; the other 
states have statutes requiring hunters to get explicit permission from 
landowners before they hunt.56 Even Vermont, which has a 
constitutional provision granting hunters the right to hunt on 
unenclosed private land, has a posting statute.57 
As of this Note’s publication, twenty-nine states require posting 
to exclude hunters. Twenty-four of these states require posting by 
statutes that pertain explicitly to hunting,58 although there are many 
 
 55. See LUND, supra note 20, at 70–72 (“In early American law, rules that required the 
landowner to post his property with notices prohibiting entry generally secured the goal of free 
access of takers to wilderness.”). 
 56. For a general discussion of state laws as of 1993, including state-by-state wildlife law 
summaries, see MUSGRAVE & STEIN, supra note 19. 
 57. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5201 (1997); see Cabot v. Thomas, 514 A.2d 1034, 1036–38 (Vt. 
1986) (recognizing the coexistence of the constitutional provision and the statute and implicitly 
finding no contradiction); see also supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 58. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.350 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-304 (West 
Supp. 2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-11-403 (Michie 2003); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2016 
(West 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.09 (West Supp. 2004); IDAHO CODE § 36-1602 (Michie 
2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-1013 (2000); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 131, § 36 (Law. Co-op. 2001); 
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variations among the statutes.59 Of these twenty-four states, nine 
require posting only for unenclosed/uncultivated land;60 the theory in 
these states is that enclosed/cultivated land is already “posted” and 
that agriculture should be spared the depredations of hunters.61 Three 
states, while lacking statutes specifically requiring that landowners 
post to exclude hunters, have general trespass statutes requiring that 
landowners post to exclude people from private land for any reason,62 
including to exclude hunters.63 Thus, twenty-seven of the twenty-nine 
 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73102 (West 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97B.001 (West Supp. 
2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-7-79 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 503.240 (Michie 1995); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:4 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23:7-1 (West 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-
6 (Michie 1995); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-2113 (McKinney 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
14-159.6 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-18 (2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 5-202 (West 
Supp. 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 498.120 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-44-4 (2002); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 23-20-14 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5201 (1997); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-7 
(Michie 2002). Alaska’s posting statute, ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.350, although general in nature, 
specifically permits landowners to post “no hunting” signs, so this Note includes it among the 
twenty-four states with posting statutes specific to hunting. The same is true for New 
Hampshire’s statute, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:4. Under Oklahoma’s posting statute, posting 
is not required for land “occupied” by the resident. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 29,  
§ 5-202. Oregon’s statute seemingly goes further and does not even mention posting as a means 
to delineate a landowner’s property—it requires, for example, a wire or hedge. OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 498.120. Notwithstanding this language, however, it is almost certain that posting would count 
as such a means. See O’Brien v. Eugene Chem. Exps., Inc., 664 P.2d 1106, 288–90 (Or. App. 
1983) (holding that posting is a means to mark one’s property boundaries). This Note does not 
address the laws of the District of Columbia because the District is quite small and presumably 
has little land available for hunting. 
 59. See infra notes 68–87 and accompanying text. 
 60. See supra note 58 (citing the statutes of Alaska, California, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, 
Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon, and Utah). North Dakota does not require posting for land 
on which cereal crops are grown. N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-22. 
 61. See supra note 41 (discussing the favored status of agriculture). 
 62. Pennsylvania’s statute, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3503 (West 2000), is based on the 
Model Penal Code’s trespass provision, which does not specifically mention hunting but 
requires posting (or fencing or enclosing) to exclude all trespassers from land (posting is not 
required for buildings and occupied structures). See also infra notes 88–89 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Model Penal Code). Washington’s statute, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.  
§ 9A.52.010 (West 2000), also requires posting to exclude all trespassers unless the land is 
fenced or otherwise enclosed “in a manner designed to exclude intruders . . . .” Wisconsin’s 
statute, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.13 (West Supp. 2004), requires posting (or oral or written notice) 
to exclude all trespassers. 
 63. Pennsylvania courts generally hold that posting is required to exclude hunters. See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Sweeley, 29 Pa. D. & C.4th 426, 433 (C.P. 1995) (“Open lands that are not 
posted or fenced off are presumed open for recreational use by the public, especially in rural 
counties where hunting and outdoor activities are common.”). A Washington statute describing 
unlawful posting specifically mentions “signs preventing hunting,” WASH. REV. CODE ANN.  
§ 77.15.220 (West 2001), and the Supreme Court of Washington has assumed that posting is 
required to exclude hunters, Hickle v. Whitney Farms, Inc., 64 P.3d 1244, 1245 (Wash. 2003). 
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states that require posting do so by statute. Although the other states 
that require posting, Maine and Louisiana, lack statutes that apply to 
posting, in both states courts nevertheless presume that unposted land 
is open to hunters.64 The remaining twenty-one states, which do not 
require posting, all have statutes requiring hunters to obtain 
landowner permission before hunting on private land.65 Three of these 
states require that permission be written.66 All twenty-one of these 
states require permission for entry onto any kind of private land, 
enclosed or unenclosed, developed or undeveloped. 
 
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has assumed that posting is required to exclude 
hunters. Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 547 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Wis. 1996). 
 64. See Lyons v. Baptist Sch. of Christian Training, 804 A.2d 364, 372 (Me. 2002) (“The 
presumption that public recreational uses of open, unposted land are permissive applies equally 
to . . . hunters and snowmobilers crossing a cultivated field after the harvest . . . .”). 
Additionally, Maine does have a specific posting statute for its saltwater islands. ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 7556–7557 (West 2003). Until very recently Louisiana had an explicit 
statute that required posting for all land, but it was repealed by 2003 LA. ACTS 802 in an effort 
to simplify the state’s trespass laws. The new, general trespass statute is LA. REV. STAT. ANN.  
§ 14:63 (West 2004), which allows landowner permission to be “implied.” It is highly likely that 
the statutory change was meant not to alter the posting requirement that existed previously. 
 65. ALA. CODE § 9-11-241 (2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-6-116 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 53a-109 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 714 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-1 
(2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 183D-26 (2001); 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.33(t) (West 2004); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 14-22-10-1 (Michie 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 716.7(2)(a) (West 2003); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 150.092 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. II § 10-411 
(Supp. 2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 569.150 (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-3-304 (2003); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-722 (2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1533.17 (West Supp. 2004); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-11-610 (Law. Co-op. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 41-9-1 (Michie 2002); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-4-106 (1995); TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 61.022 (Vernon 2002); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-132 (Michie 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-3-305 (Michie 2003). 
Connecticut requires posting to exclude nonhunting trespassers, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-
109, but posting is not required to exclude hunters, id. § 26-65. In Georgia, the default rule is 
that hunters must get permission from landowners, and landowners can also post their land so 
that hunters must obtain and carry written permission to hunt. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-1. 
Tennessee has a similar statute, requiring permission but also giving landowners the option of 
posting “hunting by written permission only” signs. TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-4-106. Missouri has 
a “classic” strict liability general trespass statute, MO. ANN. STAT. § 569.150, but the comment 
to the 1973 proposed code mentions hunting specifically: “[The statute] is directed at persons 
who do not bother to determine whether they are hunting . . . on the property of another.” A 
hunter who enters onto unposted land without permission is guilty of second-degree trespass, an 
infraction. If, however, the land is posted, the hunter is guilty of first-degree trespass, a 
misdemeanor. Id. § 569.140. 
 66. See supra note 65 (citing the statutes of Alabama, Maryland, and Ohio). 
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activities. Some of the statutes permit landowners to post “no 
trespassing” signs instead of “no hunting” signs, meaning that 
landowners may prohibit trespass for any reason.70 Other statutes 
allow landowners to post prohibitions on other specific activities, such 
as “no digging.”71 Michigan’s statute defines the act of posting as 
prohibiting all “recreational activity,” which includes hunting and 
apparently other outdoor activities as well.72 Minnesota’s statute 
similarly defines the act of posting as prohibiting “[o]utdoor 
recreation,” which it defines as “any voluntary activity, including 
hunting, fishing, trapping, boating, hiking, camping, and engaging in 
winter sports, which is conducted primarily for the purposes of 
pleasure, rest, or relaxation and is dependent upon or derives its 
principal benefit from natural surroundings.”73 Conversely, some state 
courts have construed their posting statutes such that “no hunting” 
signs prohibit only hunting and not other activities.74 
Although most posting statutes apply to trapping as well as 
hunting, some differentiate trapping and subject it to harsher rules; 
presumably this is because trapping can be especially dangerous for 
landowners, who do not know the presence and location of traps, and 
because the act of placing and leaving traps on land is somewhat more 
invasive than a hunter’s temporary presence on land. Mississippi75 and 
North Dakota,76 for instance, although requiring posting to exclude 
hunters, mandate that trappers get explicit permission from 
landowners, notwithstanding the absence of postings.  
 
 70. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:4 (1996). 
 71. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.350(b)(6) (Michie 2002). Some of the twenty-one state 
statutes that require explicit permission to hunt also require explicit permission for other 
activities. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-610 (Law. Co-op. 2003) (requiring explicit 
landowner permission for entry onto land to gather fruit, flowers, shrubbery, etc., or to cut 
timber). 
 72. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73102 (West 1999). 
 73. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97B.001(1a) (West Supp. 2004). 
 74. E.g., State v. Dixson, 766 P.2d 1015, 1024 (Or. 1988) (“In the present case, the 
defendants . . . had blocked access to their property with cables and posted ‘No Hunting’ signs. 
However, on this record there was no objective reason for the [“trespassers”] to believe that, in 
addition to the restriction on hunting, other uses such as hiking were forbidden.”).  
 75. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-7-13 (2003). This is a separate statute from Mississippi’s general 
posting statute, supra note 58. 
 76. N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-18 (2002). This statute requires that permission be written. 
Id. A special concern for the dangers of trapping is also manifest in the statutes of the twenty-
one “nonposting” states, which require landowner permission prior to hunting: Montana, for 
instance, requires that permission to trap be written, whereas permission to hunt need not be 
written. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-604 (2003). 
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Generally, the posting statutes do not preclude landowners’ right 
to exclude personally hunters whom they happen to encounter on 
their land. That is, even on unposted land in states with posting 
statutes, if landowners see hunters and tell them to leave, the hunters 
must leave.77 On the other hand, the posting statutes generally allow 
landowners to give specific hunters permission to hunt while still 
excluding the general population of hunters with postings.78 The 
statutes do not address situations in which, for whatever reason, 
hunters see no postings at a given point in time but nevertheless know 
that landowners do not want hunting on their land. 
The majority of the posting statutes are criminal statutes that 
penalize trespassers who hunt on posted land, although a few are 
unclear about whether they provide a criminal penalty or create a 
civil remedy.79 At least one seems to do the latter.80 Virginia has an 
odd criminal statute: it provides that, although a hunter must get 
explicit permission to hunt on private land (and thus, for analytical 
purposes, this Note classified it above as one of the twenty-one 
“nonposting” state statutes), a hunter who trespasses on unposted 
land is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor whereas a hunter who 
trespasses on posted land is guilty of a more serious Class 3 
 
 77. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.350(b) (Michie 2002) (stating that landowners can give 
notice against trespass directly or by posting); MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-7-79 (2003) (same). 
However, the posting statute of at least one state, Arizona, seems to indicate the contrary: “The 
entry of any person for the taking of wildlife shall not be grounds for an action for trespassing 
unless the land has been posted pursuant to this section.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-304(D) 
(West Supp. 2004). The statutes of a few states are unclear in that they do not explicitly state 
that a landowner can or cannot personally exclude a hunter. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 131, 
§ 36 (Law. Co-op. 2001) (stating that a person cannot hunt on private land without permission if 
the land is posted, but not stating whether a landowner can give personal notice against 
trespass). 
 78. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-304 (requiring hunters to get written permission 
if land is posted); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2016 (West 1998) (same); IDAHO CODE § 36-1602 
(Michie 2002) (requiring hunters to get permission if land is posted); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 131, 
§ 36 (same). 
 79. See e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-1013 (2000) (stating that the act of hunting on posted 
land is “unlawful”). Some of the statutes are unclear because they are not in distinctly criminal 
or civil codes but rather in fish and wildlife codes. See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2016 
(imposing the same requirement as the Kansas statute, but in a provision originally derived 
from the California penal code). New Jersey’s statute is unclear because it provides for “a civil 
penalty of not less than $100.00 nor more than $200.00 for the first offense” but does not 
indicate whether it is the state or private citizens who may bring suit under the provision. N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 23:7-1 (West 1997). 
 80. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-304(D) (“The entry of any person for the taking of 
wildlife shall not be grounds for an action for trespassing unless the land has been posted 
pursuant to this section.”). 
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misdemeanor.81 In addition to providing a criminal penalty or creating 
a civil remedy, many posting statutes penalize trespassing hunters by 
revoking their hunting licenses.82 Finally, a few of the criminal posting 
statutes require that landowners themselves complain before the state 
will commence prosecution.83 
Some of the posting statutes also have exceptions for hunters 
who pursue wounded animals onto posted land. Kansas, for instance, 
allows the pursuit of wounded game onto posted land, unless and 
until landowners instruct hunters to leave.84 Even some of the 
nonposting state statutes that require explicit permission from the 
landowner provide for such an exception.85 Similarly, a few posting 
statutes have exceptions for hunters who retrieve hunting dogs from 
posted land.86 
Finally, some of the posting statutes have stricter requirements 
for hunters in close proximity to buildings, animals, or other sensitive 
areas; in most cases, hunting in such areas requires affirmative 
landowner permission. Minnesota, for instance, although mandating 
posting to exclude hunters from undeveloped land, requires hunters 
to obtain written permission to hunt with a firearm within five 
hundred feet of any building occupied by a human or animal, 
including corrals or stockades.87 
B. Other Authorities and State Laws  
Various secondary sources provide general insight about whether 
and when landowners must post to exclude hunters. The Model Penal 
Code’s criminal trespass provision, on which Pennsylvania’s trespass 
statute is based,88 requires landowners to post nonfenced land 
 
 81. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-132 (Michie 2004). 
 82. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23:7-1; UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-20-14(3) (2003). 
 83. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 5-202 (West Supp. 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 498.120 
(2003); see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-159.6 (2003) (applying only in two counties). 
 84. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-1013(c); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97B.001 (West Supp. 
2004) (requiring hunters to leave immediately after retrieving wounded animals); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 20.1-01-19 (2002) (creating an absolute right for a hunter to enter posted land to 
retrieve game “shot or killed on land where the person had a lawful right to hunt”). 
 85. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 716.7(2)(a) (West 2003) (requiring, however, that the 
hunters be unarmed).  
 86. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73102 (West 1999) (stating that hunters 
cannot possess firearms when retrieving dogs); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97B.001 (stating that 
hunters must leave immediately after retrieving dogs). 
 87. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97B.001(7). 
 88. See supra note 62. 
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(excluding buildings and occupied structures) to exclude any would-
be trespassers, including hunters.89 The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
states that,  
[I]f. . . it is the custom in wooded or rural areas to permit the public 
to go hunting on private land . . . , anyone who goes hunting . . . may 
reasonably assume, in the absence of posted notice or other 
manifestation to the contrary, that there is the customary consent to 
his entry upon private land to hunt or fish.”90  
Corpus Juris Secundum notes that landowners generally have the sole 
right to game on their land,91 but it also recognizes that many states 
have criminal posting statutes92 and that custom sometimes allows 
hunters to enter unenclosed land.93 American Jurisprudence, on the 
other hand, states that a hunter in “pursuit” of game “may” be 
deemed a trespasser regardless of posting but notes that states can 
require landowners to post “no trespassing” signs for hunters 
“retrieving wounded game.”94 Thus, these secondary sources seem 
split about whether posting is required to exclude hunters. 
 
 89. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 221.2 (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985). Comment 1 states that:  
one or more of the following factors had to be shown in order to prove the offense: 
notice . . . whether by personal communication or posting of signs; intention . . . to 
hunt or shoot; entry by force . . . ; the fact that the land was of particular ownership or 
use . . . ; the fact that the trespass was in a building or structure rather than on open 
land. 
Id. § 221.2 cmt. 1 (footnotes omitted). Despite the “one or more” language of the comment, the 
text of the rule does not reflect the view that the intention to hunt or shoot is sufficient to state a 
claim for trespass. In addition, the three states whose laws the comment cites to support the 
“intention . . . to hunt or shoot” factor all require a landowner to post to exclude hunters. Id.  
§ 221.2 cmt. 1 n.2.  
 90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 cmt. d (1979). Various other Restatement 
provisions also address posting. For example, a failure to post is not considered landowner 
consent in the context of landowner liability to trespassers who habitually and notoriously 
disregard such posts. Id. § 330 cmt. c. 
 91. 38 C.J.S. Game § 5 (2003). 
 92. Id. § 59. 
 93. See id. § 52 (“A license to hunt does not confer any right on the holder to go upon lands 
owned by another, or to enter the enclosure of another, without his permission. In the case of 
unenclosed land, however, the right has sometimes been conferred by immemorial usage or by 
constitutional provision.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 94. 35A AM. JUR. 2D Fish, Game, and Wildlife Conservation § 22 (2001). “Pursuit” is not 
specifically defined; however, if hunters can be deemed trespassers merely for chasing game, 
surely they can be deemed trespassers for entering private land to hunt when not in the midst of 
a chase. 
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Many states also have other, ancillary statutes relating to this 
issue. Because most states have a stated policy of encouraging 
hunting,95 and thus encouraging private landowners to allow hunting 
on their land, some states have provided incentives for landowners 
not to post their land (and in states where posting is not required, for 
landowners to give permission to hunters).96 The incentives generally 
take two forms: protecting landowners from damage done by hunters 
and from liability for injuries suffered by hunters, and directly 
rewarding landowners for allowing hunting on their land.97 
To protect landowners from damage caused by hunters, some 
states provide for the revocation of hunting licenses if hunters 
damage property.98 Some statutes state that a hunter is liable to 
landowners for any damage done to their land.99 Other statutes simply 
state, without specifying a penalty, that hunters shall not do any 
damage to land.100 Still other states have general laws prohibiting 
certain common trespass offenses that hunters commonly commit, 
such as leaving a gate open.101 A few states have especially stringent 
punishments for hunters who accidentally kill livestock;102 New 
Hampshire actually requires the state to pay for livestock accidentally 
killed during deer hunting season.103 Finally, although state law 
regarding landowners’ liability for injuries to people on their land is a 
separate, complex area of law that is generally protective of 
 
 95. See Patrick J. Cottriel, Comment, The Right to Hunt in the Twenty-First Century: Can 
the Public Trust Doctrine Save an American Tradition?, 27 PAC. L.J. 1235, 1258–60 (1996) 
(describing the many state and federal statutes prohibiting harassment of hunters and the states’ 
interest in preserving the right to hunt). 
 96. LUND, supra note 20, at 71. 
 97. Id. 
 98. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-340 (West Supp. 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
503.185 (Michie Supp. 2003). 
 99. IDAHO CODE § 36-1602 (Michie 2002); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 131, § 61 (Law. Co-op. 
2001). 
 100. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150.092 (Banks-Baldwin 2002). This statute is from a 
nonposting state, but it is instructive nonetheless.  
 101. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-101 (2002) (defining the failure to close a 
previously unopened gate as criminal mischief, a misdemeanor). This is a statute from a 
nonposting state, but it is instructive nonetheless. 
 102. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 36-1602 (making such an act a misdemeanor). 
 103. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 425:10 (2002). 
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landowners who do not invite people onto their land,104 some states 
have created special statutes limiting landowner liability to hunters.105 
States also directly reward landowners for not posting their land. 
Some states provide owners of unposted land with wildlife for 
stocking,106 and others provide such landowners with labor, materials, 
and even plants for improving their land.107 Some states give aid in the 
form of payments to owners of unposted land for damage done by 
game animals.108 Wyoming provides a more direct form of incentive, 
requiring hunters who kill deer, antelope, or elk on private land to 
give landowners a coupon redeemable for thirteen dollars.109 
California simply pays private landowners to open their land for 
hunting.110 Even the United States Congress has considered such an 
incentive: some Senators have proposed a bill that would provide 
modest, per-acre payments from a $50 million federal fund to 
landowners who voluntarily open their land to hunting.111 
Finally, it bears repetition that state laws dealing with posting, 
hunting, and related issues are varied and complex. As a result, each 
state’s mix of laws is unique. Nonetheless, the overarching 
 
 104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 333–339 (1979) (stating that landowners 
are generally not liable to uninvited guests on their land). 
 105. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 212:34 (Supp. 2003) (stating that a landowner owes 
“no duty of care to keep such premises safe for entry or use by others for hunting, fishing, 
trapping,” or other recreational uses). 
 106. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23:2-3 (West 1997). 
 107. E.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 11-0305(1), 11-0501(10)(a)–(c) (McKinney  
Supp. 2004). 
 108. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 36-1108 (Michie Supp. 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 29.889 (West 
2004); see, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207:22-a (2001) (allowing landowners to participate in 
the wildlife damage control program only if their land is unposted or if their land is posted 
“Hunting by Permission Only” and permission is reasonably granted).  
 109. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-3-105 (Michie 2003). Wyoming is a nonposting state; thus, the 
incentive is actually directed at convincing landowners to give explicit permission to hunters. 
The statute is instructive nonetheless.  
 110. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 1573 (West 1998); see also Sportsman’s Guide to Access 
Yes, at http://fishandgame.idaho.gov/hunt/access/2004accessyes.asp (describing Idaho’s “Access 
Yes!” program, which pays landowners to open their land to hunting) (last visited Nov. 4, 2004) 
(on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 111. Voluntary Public Access and Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program Act of 2003, S. 1840,  
108th Cong. § 3 (2003); see also Voluntary Public Access and Wildlife Habitat Incentive  
Program Act of 2003, H.R. 3482, 108th Cong. (2003) (providing the House’s version  
of this legislation); Press Release, Senator Kent Conrad, “Open Fields Incentives” Legislation  
Offered by Conrad (Oct. 9, 2003) (summarizing the legislation), available at 
http://conrad.senate.gov/~conrad/releases/03/10/2003A12901.html. 
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presumption that landowners who do not post their land have opened 
their property to hunters clearly exists in more than half of the states. 
III.  A CRITIQUE OF THE POSTING STATUTES 
A. Legal Arguments Against the Statutes 
The posting statutes create an obvious problem: they pit the 
rights of one group, hunters, against the rights of another group, 
landowners. The rights of both groups are powerful. For hunters, the 
right to hunt and trap on all land has its source in the early national 
egalitarian desire to allow everyone to hunt.112 But landowners’ right 
to exclude is a pillar of the common law; as the Supreme Court has 
stated, this right is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of 
rights that are commonly characterized as property . . . .”113 
Landowners wishing to argue that posting statutes unduly infringe 
upon their property rights have two legal arguments: (1) that the 
common law right to exclude is paramount, and that the posting 
statutes do not interfere with that right or its civil enforcement; and 
(2) that, if the posting statutes do interfere, they have created an 
unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation.114 Both 
of these arguments, however, are weak. 
Landowners could argue that there is no inconsistency between 
the common law and the posting statutes because the statutes simply 
impose a criminal penalty against people trespassing on posted land; 
they do not abrogate landowners’ civil remedy for trespass on 
unposted land, at least in the majority of states where the posting 
statutes are criminal.115 As Rod Froelich argued in North Dakota state 
court, the common law protects landowners against intrusion by 
providing both criminal penalties against trespassers and civil causes 
of action for landowners.116 The United States Supreme Court has 
stated that “the law of civil trespass . . . has always been recognized[] 
by the common law in general . . . as a field quite distinct and separate 
 
 112. See supra Part I.B. 
 113. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). 
 114. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that “private property [shall not] be taken for public 
use, without just compensation”). Various states also have constitutional provisions mirroring 
the Fifth Amendment. E.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15. 
 115. See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. 
 116. Froelich Brief, supra note 6, at 1–3. 
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from criminal trespass,”117 and that civil and criminal sanctions for 
injuries to property rights often coexist: 
Petitioners make much of the fact that the 1793 Act contained 
criminal penalties in arguing that the Act pre-empted common-law 
actions. In property law, however, it is common to have criminal and 
civil sanctions available for infringement of property rights, and for 
government officials to use the police power to remove trespassers 
from privately owned land.118 
This argument is buttressed further by the fact that criminal trespass 
provisions, such as the one in the Model Penal Code, have 
traditionally required that trespassers knowingly trespass,119 and 
posting statutes are aimed at ensuring that hunters know when they 
are trespassing. Finally, it can be said that “[c]riminal trespass statutes 
do not afford a substitute for adequate civil remedies for trespass.”120 
This argument, however, suffers from two problems. First, the 
common law is not entirely clear about the specific issue of whether 
landowners possess a civil remedy against hunters who enter 
unposted land to hunt. Admittedly, the position of Blackstone,121 and 
of the Supreme Court in cases such as Kaiser Aetna v. United States,122 
is that a civil remedy does exist when it comes to trespass in general. 
By contrast, however, sources such as the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts123 and Corpus Juris Secundum124 indicate that under common 
law hunters had the right to enter unposted land without explicit 
landowner permission—thus precluding a civil remedy. The Supreme 
 
 117. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 357 (1964); see Froelich Brief, supra note 6, at 
10 (citing Bouie and noting the distinction between civil and criminal trespass). 
 118. Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 239 (1985); see Froelich Brief, 
supra note 6, at 10 (citing Oneida County and noting that “[t]he posting statute simply adds a 
layer of criminal sanctions . . . without abrogating . . . preexisting civil sanctions”). 
 119. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 221.2 (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985); see also 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 177 (2003) (“Many criminal trespass 
statutes require that notice or warning be given to a person that his presence on the premises is 
prohibited, since many criminal statutes require that the trespass be knowingly committed.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 120. 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 166; see Froelich Brief, supra note 6, at 12–13 (citing 
American Jurisprudence 2d and arguing that criminal statutes are inadequate because 
landowners cannot compel prosecutions for trespass). 
 121. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 122. 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). 
 123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 cmt. d (1979); supra note 90 and 
accompanying text. 
 124. 38 C.J.S. Game § 5, 52, 59 (2003); supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
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Court in McKee v. Gratz125 and Oliver v. United States,126 purporting to 
describe the common law of the United States in general,127 
apparently took this latter view. The question may well be one of 
what exactly is the common law: did the common law that existed in 
England at the time of the American Revolution survive in this 
nation, or did American common law take a different path? Because 
of this ambiguity, whether the common law provides a civil remedy 
for trespass on unposted land is, at the very least, unclear. 
Still more problematic is that, even if American common law 
provides a civil remedy for trespass on unposted land, it seems clear 
that state posting statutes aim to abrogate this remedy. As an initial 
matter, legislatures certainly have the right to alter the common law 
by statute.128 The general rule is that courts should construe statutes to 
avoid any potential constitutional problem;129 however, when a statute 
and its legislative history are clear, a court is unlikely to construe a 
statute awkwardly simply to avoid such a problem.130 In the posting 
context, although a construction of the posting statutes abrogating 
any civil remedy might appear to cause a takings problem,131 any 
construction that would allow a civil trespass remedy seems tortured 
and would conflict with the history of the posting statutes. Although 
the text of the statutes standing alone may be unclear about whether 
a common law civil remedy survives the statutes’ enactment, the 
history of the statutes is not: they were enacted to ensure that all 
citizens had the right to hunt, even on the land of others, so long as 
the land was unposted.132 In the Froelich case, for example, when 
Froelich argued that the statutes were not designed to abrogate the 
common law right of civil redress,133 the defendants flatly stated that 
 
 125. 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922); see supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 126. 466 U.S. 170, 193–94 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see supra note 54 and 
accompanying text. Although this proposition was clearest in Justice Marshall’s dissent in this 
case, this portion of the dissent agreed with the Court majority. 
 127. Although the Court does not have the final word on the content of the common law of 
any individual state, it is telling that the Supreme Court considers American common law to 
allow hunting on unposted land. 
 128. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Common Law § 15 (2004). 
 129. E.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001). 
 130. See, e.g., U.S. v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985) (“We cannot press statutory construction 
‘to the point of disingenuous evasion’ even to avoid a constitutional question.” (citations 
omitted)).  
 131. See infra notes 137–53 and accompanying text. 
 132. See supra Part II.B.  
 133. Froelich Brief, supra note 6, at 13. 
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“[t]he law of trespass and [the] ‘posting’ requirements are plainly set 
out”134 to allow hunters to enter unposted, private land, and that 
“[t]he assumption that unposted land is open for hunting has been the 
case for decades, if not since statehood.”135 Owners of unposted land 
could sue hunters if courts were willing to construe posting statutes to 
provide only criminal sanctions for trespass on posted land. But this is 
unlikely because such a statutory construction would directly conflict 
with the posting statutes’ legislative history and with most states’ 
strongly professed policy of promoting hunting.136 
Construing the posting statutes as they must be construed, 
however, creates at least one137 possible constitutional problem: 
takings. This is the second possible argument for a landowner  
wishing to challenge the statutes. The Takings Clause of  
the U.S. Constitution138 and many similar clauses of state 
 
 134. North Dakota Brief, supra note 8, at 5. 
 135. Wetzel, supra note 2. 
 136. See, for example, the prohunting stance of most state wildlife agencies, Eric Biber, 
Exploring Regulatory Options for Controlling the Introduction of Non-Indigenous Species to the 
United States, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 375, 406 n.184 (1999), state constitutional provisions 
safeguarding the right to hunt, N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 27; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 26, and recent 
statutes that prohibit hunter harassment, Jeffrey S. Thiede, Comment, Aiming for 
Constitutionality in the First Amendment Forest: An Analysis of Hunter Harassment Statutes, 48 
EMORY L.J. 1023, 1023–26 (1999). 
 137. Another possible constitutional argument is that substantive due process may require a 
form of intermediate scrutiny when the government abolishes certain “core” common law 
rights. See Froelich Brief, supra note 6, at 14–15 (making this argument). As Justice Marshall 
stated, 
I do not understand the Court to suggest . . . that there is no federal constitutional 
barrier to the abrogation of common-law rights by Congress or a state 
government. . . . Quite serious constitutional questions might be raised if a legislature 
attempted to abolish certain categories of common-law rights in some general way. 
Indeed, our cases demonstrate that there are limits on governmental authority to 
abolish “core” common-law rights, including rights against trespass, at least without a 
compelling showing of necessity or a provision for a reasonable alternative remedy. 
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93–94 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted). It is certainly arguable that allowing hunters unfettered 
access to private land is not a compelling need. See infra Part III.B. However, the Court has 
avoided delving into such a confused issue as when the abrogation of the common law right 
against trespass, or the abrogation of any other common law right, has violated substantive due 
process. In light of this confusion, and in light of the possible nonexistence of a common law 
right against trespassing hunters, see supra text accompanying notes 121–27, the argument seems 
unlikely to persuade a state court. In addition, the argument, to a large extent, is coextensive 
with the takings argument: if a taking is found to exist, the posting statute will be 
unconstitutional; if not, the posting statute will be constitutional. 
 138. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause has applied to the states since the Supreme 
Court incorporated it into the Fourteenth Amendment and applied it to a state statute. See Pa. 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
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constitutions139 forbid the taking of private property without just 
compensation. The Supreme Court has analyzed takings claims as 
either regulatory or physical:140 physical takings can be either per se 
physical takings or compensable physical invasions.141 In Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,142 the Court defined a per se 
physical taking as one that destroys all of a landowner’s property 
rights, including the rights to possess, use, and exclude.143 Despite this 
language, which seems to suggest that a landowner must lose all of 
these property rights to show a per se physical taking, the Court in 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission144 firmly stated that simply 
requiring a landowner to cede a permanent public easement 
constitutes such a taking: 
We think a “permanent physical occupation” has occurred, for 
purposes of [the Loretto] rule, where individuals are given a 
permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real 
property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular 
individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the 
premises.145 
Consistent with Nollan, the Court has elsewhere stated that a physical 
invasion of “only” an easement requires compensation146 and that 
governmental authorization of others’ physical invasion is sufficient 
for a takings claim.147 The posting statutes force landowners to grant 
 
 139. E.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 22. 
 140. E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); see 
Rebecca E. Harrison, Comment, When Animals Invade and Occupy: Physical Takings and the 
Endangered Species Act, 78 WASH. L. REV. 867, 875–76 (2003) (summarizing Supreme Court 
takings jurisprudence as dividing takings law into regulatory takings, per se physical takings, and 
compensable physical invasions). 
 141. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434–35. 
 142. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 143. Id. at 435–36. 
 144. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 145. Id. at 832. The Court’s analysis of whether this particular easement constituted a taking 
was more complex because the plaintiff was required to grant the easement only as a condition 
for receiving a building permit. Id. at 834–37. The Court here, however, was simply stating that 
requiring an owner to grant an easement in the absence of such conditions would certainly be a 
taking. See also Froelich Brief, supra note 6, at 18–19 (making this argument). 
 146. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979). 
 147. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432 n.9. 
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easements to the public,148 so they would seem to constitute takings 
under Nollan. 
Nevertheless, the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council149 held that even severe limitations on property rights are not 
takings so long as they are not “newly legislated or decreed” but 
rather “inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background 
principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place 
upon land ownership.”150 The Court even specifically stated that “we 
assuredly would permit the government to assert a permanent 
easement that was a pre-existing limitation upon the landowner’s 
title.”151 
Thus, the holding in Lucas would focus the inquiry on the extent 
to which a hunting easement was a preexisting limitation upon a 
landowner’s title. This is another form of the same question, stated 
above,152 of whether the common law provides landowners with a civil 
trespass remedy against people hunting on their unposted land. That 
is, if the common law does not provide such a remedy, the hunting 
easement is a “background principle” of state property law, and if the 
common law does provide a remedy, the hunting easement is not a 
“background principle.” As noted above, this is an open question. 
But given that a court would likely seek a reason to uphold a posting 
statute, and given that many of the state posting statutes are nearly as 
old as the states themselves, such a court would likely conclude that 
 
 148. Easements for hunters which stretch over landowners’ entire property are larger than 
that in Nollan, which was only, at most, ten feet wide. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 853–54 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). Although landowners can temporarily “remove” the easements by posting, posting 
can be difficult and expensive, and signs can fall off or be removed. See Hearing, supra note 11 
(statements of Anna Marsob and Nancy Laizure) (describing how difficult posting can be); 
supra Part II.A (noting the exacting requirements of many posting statutes). In addition, the 
actual physical space occupied by the required signs could itself be thought of as an easement, 
so that the easement is actually permanent. See Froelich Brief, supra note 6, at 20 (making this 
argument). If a court were to consider the easement merely temporary, however, it is even more 
likely that the court would uphold the posting statute authorizing the easement given that 
temporary physical invasions are considered less egregious than permanent ones. See Loretto, 
458 U.S. at 435 n.12 (“[T]emporary limitations [on the right to exclude] are subject to a more 
complex balancing process to determine whether they are a taking.”). 
 149. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 150. Id. at 1029. 
 151. Id. at 1028–29. For this proposition, the Court cited Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 
(1900), which held that the government’s navigational servitude on a private landowner’s 
interest in submerged land was not a taking, partly because that servitude was preexisting. Id. at 
143. 
 152. See supra notes 121–27 and accompanying text. 
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the public’s right to hunt on private land, absent posting, was a 
preexisting easement on a landowner’s title.153 
Therefore, the two legal arguments that landowners can assert 
against the posting statutes likely would be unsuccessful under 
current legal doctrine. Despite this result, as the next Section shows, 
social changes since the founding of this country have only increased 
the prejudice to landowners’ rights, to the extent that the posting 
statutes should be repealed or modified. 
B. The Posting Statutes in Light of Changes in Society 
The posting statutes were designed to balance the rights of two 
different groups: hunters and landowners. For many Americans, 
hunting is an almost sacred activity, one enshrined in the national 
culture. For these people, the posting statutes surely seem a 
reasonable compromise. For others, the posting statutes unfairly 
eviscerate the rights of landowners for an insufficiently important 
purpose. Although the posting statutes, when originally conceived, 
may indeed have struck a reasonable compromise, social changes 
over the last several hundred years have altered the balance to an 
unfortunate degree, unfairly increasing the burden on landowners. 
Specifically, the need to hunt has been eliminated, and the impact on 
certain landowners—especially those who dislike hunting—has 
greatly increased. As the Supreme Court has recently underscored, 
when the reason for a rule no longer exists, the rule may (or should) 
no longer apply.154 
One of the most dramatic social changes from the early days of 
America is that today almost no Americans rely on subsistence 
hunting. In the post–Industrial Revolution era of twenty-four-hour 
grocery stores, it is a rare sight indeed to see someone hunting for 
survival. In addition, hunting has become a middle- and upper-class 
 
 153. This conclusion is equally damning to the additional argument that the requirement of 
posting signs itself is a taking, no matter how small or unobtrusive the signs may be. See supra 
note 148. 
 154. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001) (“Cessante ratione legis cessat ipse lex.” 
(quoting 1 SIR EDWARD COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *70b)); see also 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897): 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down 
in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid 
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of 
the past. 
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pastime.155 The number of hunters per capita has also substantially 
decreased: even since 1955—a good seventy-five years after the 
Industrial Revolution and well into the era of specialized labor and 
the decline of family-owned farms—the number of hunters in 
America has increased by only 31 percent, whereas the population 
has increased by 71 percent.156 In fact, from 1996 to 2001 the number 
of hunters actually decreased by nearly 7 percent to around 13 
million, about 6 percent of the total U.S. population.157 Hunting 
arguably remains a wildlife management tool,158 but it is clear that 
hunting today is not a necessity so much as a recreation. Although 
contemporary hunters may at times evoke (and invoke) early 
American imagery of populist hunting, early America has long since 
vanished. 
Societal attitudes toward animals in general have undergone a 
major transformation. At the founding of the country, there were 
almost no animal-rights activists, or even vegetarians.159 This is not to 
say that early Americans cared nothing about animal welfare; indeed, 
 
 155. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR & U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2001 NAT’L SURVEY OF FISHING, HUNTING, AND WILDLIFE-
ASSOCIATED RECREATION 30 (2002) [hereinafter U.S. SURVEY] (finding that more than half of 
all hunters come from households earning over forty thousand dollars per year), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/fhw01-us.pdf. 
 156. Id. at 6. The number of anglers, however, increased faster than the rate of population 
growth. Id. 
 157. Id. app. B at B-5. 
 158. The extent to which hunting is necessary in this regard is a topic of lively debate. See 
Andrew Daire, The Right to Pursue Game vs. The Government’s Right to the Conservation of 
Wildlife, 10 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 115, 117–19 (2003) (detailing the disagreement). Compare M. 
Nils Peterson, An Approach for Demonstrating the Social Legitimacy of Hunting, 32 WILDLIFE 
SOC’Y BULL. 310, 310 (2004) (arguing that hunting is a vital wildlife management tool), with 
Jacqueline Tresl, Shoot First, Talk Later: Blowing Holes in Freedom of Speech, 8 ANIMAL L. 
177, 179 (2002) (expressing doubt about the wildlife management rationale), and THE FUND 
FOR ANIMALS, HUNTING FACT SHEET #1, at 1 (Sept. 14, 2002) (arguing that “wildlife 
management” is an invalid justification for hunting and pointing out statements of the New 
Jersey Division of Fish, Game, and Wildlife to the effect that state wildlife management is solely 
geared toward providing animals for recreational hunting), available at 
http://fund.org/uploads/fs_hunt1.pdf. 
 159. Cf. HARVEY A. LEVENSTEIN, REVOLUTION AT THE TABLE: THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE AMERICAN DIET 4 (1988) (noting that during the first half of the nineteenth century 
“people on both sides of the British North Atlantic were carnivores of the first order”). See 
generally M. Varn Chandola, Dissecting American Animal Protection Law: Healing the Wounds 
with Animal Rights and Eastern Enlightenment, 8 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 12–21 (Winter 2002) 
(discussing the historical and philosophical views of animals in the West); Martha C. Nussbaum, 
Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical Basis, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1506, 1513–26 (2001) 
(reviewing STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS 
(2000)). 
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many early Americans were quite concerned with the transportation 
and labor benefits that animals provided, and some were concerned 
with ecosystem management and the continued existence of animals 
as a source for subsistence hunting.160 Rather, early American 
attitudes toward animals were simply what one would expect of a 
young, rural country at that moment in history: pragmatic and not 
concerned with high-minded idealism that considered the killing of 
animals in any way immoral. 
Over the past two centuries, however, American attitudes toward 
animals have changed, undoubtedly in part by virtue of the 
elimination of the need to hunt—or even to eat meat, as some have 
argued.161 Organizations such as the Humane Society of the United 
States or the more radical People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals (PETA) have arisen to safeguard animal rights. Some legal 
scholars have even argued for a fundamental alteration of the 
property status of animals.162 Eminent twentieth-century figures, such 
as Mahatma Gandhi, have fervently advocated vegetarianism for 
moral reasons.163 Bruce G. Friedrich, a PETA official, has argued, 
quoting Martin Luther King, Jr., that “the arc of history is long, but 
that it bends towards justice,” so that one day people will look back 
on meat-eaters as they now do on slave owners.164 It is true that the 
majority of Americans are not vegetarians, and that sentiments such 
as those of Gandhi and, especially, of Friedrich are not widely 
shared.165 The point, however, is that some people now have these 
views, and that for them the matter is quite clear, no matter how 
radical the majority of Americans may find their views.  
 
 160. See LUND, supra note 20, at 28–31 (noting various wildlife statutes enacted to ensure 
the usefulness and continued existence of animals). 
 161. See Richard Corliss, Should We All Be Vegetarians?, TIME, July 15, 2002, at 48, 48–56 
(summarizing the debate regarding whether eating meat is necessary and whether a vegetarian 
diet is healthy).  
 162. See, e.g., David Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership for Animals, 50 DUKE L.J. 473, 476 
(2000) (arguing that the legal and equitable components of living property can and should be 
severed, with the equitable component being vested in animals themselves); Nussbaum, supra 
note 159, at 1511–13 (advocating substantial change in the legal status of animals and providing 
a theoretical framework for such change). 
 163. Mahatma Gandhi, The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism, Address at a Social  
Meeting of the London Vegetarian Society (Nov. 20, 1931), available at 
http://www.ivu.org/news/evu/other/gandhi2.html. 
 164. Bruce G. Friedrich, Preface to VASU MURTI, THEY SHALL NOT HURT OR DESTROY: 
ANIMAL RIGHTS AND VEGETARIANISM IN THE WESTERN RELIGIOUS TRADITION v, vi (1999). 
 165. Corliss, supra note 161, at 51–52. 
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Moreover, even the average American’s attitude toward animals 
has greatly changed. Many Americans are now members of the 
mainstream Humane Society and local pet rescue clubs. 
Vegetarianism, although not a majority practice, has been increasing 
in popularity and is no longer an “odd” or “radical” choice, with 
many vegetarians choosing not to eat meat out of concern for animal 
welfare.166 Many people who do not hunt now enjoy simply watching 
wildlife, whether at a state park or outside of their own windows. 
Perhaps the best example of changing attitudes is overseas, in 
England, where at the turn of the millennium the centuries-old sport 
of foxhunting with dogs came under attack and was banned, after 
already having been banned in Scotland.167 Although this Note deals 
with America, the example of English foxhunting demonstrates the 
plausibility that the majority of Americans will one day disfavor 
hunting.168 In the end, however, it is sufficient to say that American 
attitudes toward animals have changed, and that a significant number 
of contemporary Americans would not want animals killed on their 
land. Some people, especially hunters, surely would disagree with 
these sentiments, but the sentiments exist nonetheless. 
Another major social shift in the last several hundred years has 
been the shift to smaller land parcels and suburbanization. At 
America’s founding, the country was predominantly rural, with plenty 
of large tracts and room for expansion.169 Parcels of land were 
generally large. During the twentieth century, however—and 
especially during the latter half of that century—the American 
population became increasingly suburban and decreasingly rural.170 In 
 
 166. Id.  
 167. Christopher Adams, PM Faces Long Court Battle as Hunting Ban Is Forced into Law, 
FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 19, 2004, at 4; Alison Hardie, Boxing Day Hunt on Its Last Legs?, 
THE SCOTSMAN, Dec. 27, 2003, at 3. Hunting foxes with the aid of dogs is the most popular 
method of fox hunting and has the deepest historical roots. 
 168. National Geographic wonders whether foxhunting—which some people might consider 
more harmful to animal rights than other forms of hunting, such as deer hunting, that at least 
yield food—might come under attack in the United States. Laura Howden, Is U.S. Safe from 
Foxhunting Debate?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (May 31, 2002), at 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2002/05/0530_020532_fox.html (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal). 
 169. Cf. LUND, supra note 20, at 19–34 (describing the geography as it related to hunting in 
early America). 
 170. FRANK HOBBS & NICOLE STOOPS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, DEMOGRAPHIC 
TRENDS IN THE 20TH CENTURY 32–33 (2002), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf. 
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1910, only 7.1 percent of the population lived in suburban areas171 
whereas 72 percent lived in rural areas.172 By 2000, 50 percent of 
Americans resided in suburban areas,173 and the rural population had 
dropped to 20 percent.174 Unlike the early days of the nation, then, 
modern America is predominantly urban and suburban—with half of 
the country owning small- to medium-sized plots on the edge of a 
metropolis, adjacent to farm country. 
Another change in America is the existence of modern, 
commercial hunting preserves. Whether a result of increased 
suburbanization, modern hunting’s recreational nature, or the 
increasingly middle-class demographic of hunters (many of whom 
want an organized, vacation-like experience),175 private land available 
for hunting now exists all over the nation.176 And the majority of 
hunting in America takes place on private land—in 2001, 74 percent 
of hunting days were on private land,177 and hunters spent $371 
million on trip-related private land-use fees and $4 billion on private 
land leases/purchases for hunting.178 As a result, the recreational 
activity of hunting can now be a source of income for landowners.179 
It is within the context of these social changes that the posting 
statutes and the collision of rights they generate must be analyzed. 
The most significant social change is that hunting is no longer a 
necessity. This fact alone seems sufficient to justify the assertion that 
the posting statutes harm landowners’ property rights in order to 
serve a relatively insignificant purpose—facilitating one small group’s 
recreational pursuit. 
Almost equally important is that the degree of harm to 
landowners’ property rights has increased because of landowners’ 
 
 171. Id. at 33 fig.1-15. 
 172. Id. at 32 fig.1-14. 
 173. Id. at 33 fig.1-15. 
 174. Id. at 32 fig.1-14. 
 175. See supra notes 155, 169–74 and accompanying text.  
 176. EDWARD L. KOZICKY, HUNTING PRESERVES III-A 11, at 
http://wildlife.tamu.edu/publications/ a075.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2004) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal). 
 177. U.S. SURVEY, supra note 155, at 80 tbl.28. 
 178. Id. at 73 tbl.18. 
 179. See, e.g., RURAL ENTERPRISE & ALTERNATIVE DEV. INITIATIVE, ILL. COUNCIL ON 
FOOD & AGRIC. RESEARCH & S. ILL. UNIV. CARBONDALE, REP. NO. 2, ALTERNATIVE 
AGRICULTURE: CAN FEE HUNTING INCREASE YOUR BOTTOM LINE? 1–4 (2001) (detailing how 
landowners can make money from charging hunters fees to hunt on their land), available at 
http://www.siu.edu/~readi/grains/ factsheets/hunting.pdf. 
SIGMON FINAL.DOC 6/6/2005 10:38 AM 
2004] HUNTING AND POSTING ON PRIVATE LAND 579 
changing attitudes toward animals; that is, especially for people who 
consider the killing of animals morally wrong, but also for people who 
would simply prefer to observe or enjoy the presence of wildlife, the 
diminution of their right to exclude has become more egregious than 
it was in early America. Regardless of whether people opposed to the 
killing of animals are in the mainstream, for many of them it is a 
significant insult to have animals killed on their land. Some people 
might even want to use their land as a sanctuary for animals, and the 
posting statutes make achieving that goal difficult, if not impossible. 
Put simply, people have the freedom of conscience to think what they 
will about animal rights and hunting, and for those whose consciences 
dictate that animals should not be killed, their right to exclude 
hunters from their land becomes paramount.  
The degree of harm to landowners’ property interests has also 
increased because the posting statutes make it more difficult for 
landowners who wish to allow hunting on their land for a fee—
whether in the form of a lease or a one-time, informal payment—to 
do so. This is true for two reasons. First, to charge hunters a fee, 
landowners must post their land properly—otherwise hunters can 
simply enter without permission. As previously noted, proper posting 
can be difficult, if not impossible; or at the very least it requires a 
good deal of expense and effort.180 Second, the existence of other 
unposted or improperly posted land, which hunters can enter without 
charge, makes it less likely that hunters will pay for the privilege of 
hunting on the land of a private landowner who wants to charge a fee. 
Landowners have made and will continue to make money from 
allowing hunters to hunt on their land, but laws requiring individual 
landowners to post make this endeavor substantially more difficult. 
In addition, the increasing suburbanization of America means 
that one traditional problem with the now-recreational activity of 
hunting—accidental injuries—affects nonhunters more closely than 
before.181 According to the International Hunter Education 
Association, in the United States between 1994 and 2001 there was an 
average of at least 993 hunting casualties per year, with an average of 
 
 180. See supra notes 13–15, 68–69 and accompanying text. 
 181. See, e.g., Rick Barrett, Neighbors Oppose Hunt Plan for Land: Safety Concerns Raised 
in Town of Delafield, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 1, 2002, at B1 (noting citizen concerns 
about a proposed hunting area near suburban developments). But see Bob Hodge, Deer, Deer: 
A Wise-Acre Decision Turns Political, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL (Knoxville, TN), Feb. 13, 
2000, at C8 (discussing the Tennessee Wildlife Resource Agency’s argument that hunting near 
suburbs poses few risks to hunters). 
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at least 91 fatal casualties.182 Most casualties affect hunters themselves, 
but accidental shootings of hikers, bird watchers, and even suburban 
residents at home are not uncommon.183 As the suburbs expand, laws 
allowing hunters to enter smaller, private tracts will only increase the 
number of accidental injuries. Suburban landowners should be given 
the choice of whether to allow this danger.184  
Thus, while it is arguable that the posting statutes have always 
required too great a sacrifice of landowners, that sacrifice has only 
grown more severe for some and now serves a significantly less 
important purpose than it did historically. The next Part suggests a 
change. 
IV.  SOLUTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
This Note has shown that, given the social changes since the 
formulation of state posting statutes, the statutes tip the balance 
between hunters’ rights and landowners’ rights too far in favor of 
hunters. Despite the probable lack of any judicial remedy, legislatures 
 
 182. These data are extrapolated from annual reports issued by the organization from 1994 
to 2001. See Int’l Hunter Educ. Assoc., Annual Reports of Hunting and Hunting Related 
Incidents, at http://www.ihea.com/docs/Incident_Reports1 (last visited Nov. 30, 2004) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal). These numbers are certainly conservative because not every state 
reports, and presumably not every incident is reported. See, e.g., id. (noting the states for which 
data are unavailable at the top of each table of incident statistics). The statistics also include 
Canada, but in the few years for which the Canadian data is separable from the American data, 
Canada accounts for only a miniscule number of the total casualties. See, e.g., id. (documenting 
that casualties from Canadian incidents numbered only 39 of 1181 in 1994, 41 of 1242 in 1995, 
and 40 of 1019 in 1997). 
 183. See, e.g., Matt Crawford, Charges ‘Unlikely’ in Freak Shooting, BURLINGTON FREE 
PRESS (Burlington, VT), Nov. 24, 2003, at A1 (describing an incident in which a man was killed 
by a hunter while watching football in his home); Jingle Davis, Hunters, Hikers Will Still Share 
Trail, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 26, 2002, at 4A (describing an incident in which a hunter killed 
a hiker on the Appalachian Trail); Widow Seeks Hunter-Education Rule, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 
22, 2003, at B4 (describing the efforts of a widow whose husband was mistaken for an elk and 
killed). 
 184. It is true that increasing suburbanization and the resulting small parcels mean fewer 
suburban landowners are able to hunt entirely on their own land. Furthermore, suburbanization 
makes requiring affirmative permission from landowners more onerous than it once would have 
been, because it means that more landowners must be contacted. But nothing prevents avid 
suburban hunters from purchasing or leasing nonsuburban land, or visiting free public tracts of 
nonsuburban land, on which to hunt. In any case, a somewhat increased burden on hunting does 
not change the facts mentioned above—most notably, that hunting is now a recreation, albeit an 
important one for certain people, that heavily burdens some landowners and infringes upon 
their property rights. Finally, even if suburban landowners are more fearful of hunters than the 
statistics justify, the irrational nature of their fear is no reason to destroy their property rights. 
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have the ability to change the law. It is on such change this Note now 
focuses. 
A. Remedies at the State Level 
To adequately protect landowners’ rights, state legislatures in the 
twenty-seven states that have posting statutes185 should take the 
simple step of repealing those statutes and enacting new statutes 
requiring affirmative landowner consent for hunters wishing to hunt 
on private land. These new statutes could take either the larger step 
of clearly criminalizing all trespass on private property and providing 
a civil remedy or the smaller step of retaining the posting requirement 
but making it clear that this requirement operates only to criminalize 
trespass, without destroying landowners’ right to sue civilly for 
trespass on unposted land.186 
Short of repealing the posting statutes, state legislatures could 
take other, lesser actions that would alleviate the injury done to 
landowners’ property rights. For instance, states could retain their 
posting statutes for all forms of recreation except hunting, on the 
rationale that hunters are more prevalent and dangerous than 
participants in other recreational activities, and that they may inflict 
greater damage on property rights because certain landowners are 
morally opposed to hunting.187 This strategy—which, in fact, 
Connecticut has adopted188—would allow states to provide protection 
for hikers, sightseers, and other people involved in recreational 
 
 185. As previously noted, the nonstatutory posting requirements of Maine and Louisiana 
are similar to the statutory posting requirements of the twenty-seven states with posting 
statutes. See supra note 67. Thus, although Maine and Louisiana obviously cannot repeal any 
statute to remedy this problem, they can follow the other suggestions in this Part—for instance, 
they can enact statutes to explicitly require that hunters obtain landowner consent before 
hunting on private land. 
 186. See supra notes 116–20 and accompanying text (discussing Rod Froelich’s argument 
that courts should construe the posting statute to apply only to criminal trespass, rather than to 
abrogate a landowner’s common law civil remedy). Although this Note has argued that such an 
argument seems flawed, largely because of the clear history and legislative intent of the statutes, 
see supra notes 121–36 and accompanying text, it certainly would be feasible and reasonable for 
state legislatures to “override” this history and intent to make clear that the statutes apply only 
to criminal sanctions. 
 187. See supra notes 159–68 and accompanying text. 
 188. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 26-65(b) (West 1999) (requiring landowner consent to hunt 
on private land); id. § 53a-109 (West 1990) (establishing criminal trespass liability for entering 
any land, posted or unposted, for the purpose of hunting, but requiring posting or fencing to 
establish liability for entry for other purposes). Other states that require affirmative consent to 
hunt on private land may also have posting statutes for nonhunting trespassers.  
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activities. States could also make posting easier, for example, by 
allowing landowners to post a single notice at the county courthouse, 
online, or in some other database.189 Doing so would eliminate the 
expense and effort of posting, as well as the problem of signs’ falling 
down or being torn down; it would also make it simple for hunters to 
verify that land on which they intended to hunt was open to hunting. 
Neither of these solutions would irreparably harm hunting. 
Twenty-one states already have statutes that require affirmative 
consent to hunt,190 and there is no evidence that hunting is 
unreasonably difficult in any of those states. Those states are not 
geographically concentrated in any way: hunting requires affirmative 
landowner permission in Midwestern states such as South Dakota; in 
large, game-filled states such as Texas; in Southern states such as 
Tennessee; and in Mid-Atlantic states such as Delaware.191 If states 
remained concerned about the availability of land for hunting, they 
could either create more incentives for private landowners to open 
their land to hunting—possibly with the help of the federal 
government192—or increase access to public land for hunting by 
purchasing more land or by easing restrictions on existing public land. 
Such a solution would preserve the integrity both of private land 
ownership and of hunting. 
B. Remedies at the Municipal Level 
Municipalities, as entities distinct from states, could also take 
action to remedy the imbalance between hunters’ and private 
landowners’ rights. Specifically, municipalities could take the same 
measures mentioned above: requiring landowner permission to hunt 
on private land or modifying the posting statutes.193 
 
 189. North Carolina, for instance, had an easier posting requirement dating back to colonial 
times and into the nineteenth century. See 2 WILLIAM T. DORTCH ET AL., THE CODE OF 
NORTH CAROLINA § 2831 (1883) (codifying a 1784 statute, 1784 N.C. Sess. Laws 33 § 5, that 
required posting only in “two or more public places” and amended an earlier colonial statute to 
require that posting be done “at the court house door of the county”). North Carolina’s current 
posting statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-159.7 (2003), was added in 1949 and requires posting of 
land in a manner similar to the posting statutes of other states, 1949 N.C. Sess. Laws 887; see 
supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra Part II.A (discussing the relevant statutes of every state). 
 191. See supra note 65 (listing the statutes of states requiring affirmative landowner 
consent). 
 192. See supra notes 106–11 and accompanying text. 
 193. In addition, municipalities could take a further step, which some have already done: 
ban hunting within municipal limits, on the rationale that hunting is unacceptably dangerous in 
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Municipalities do face one impediment if they decide to take 
such action—preemption. The regulation of firearms (including 
ownership restrictions and licensing) is a field that states have 
traditionally occupied completely, thus preempting any municipal 
ordinances in conflict with state law.194 The traditional regulation of 
firearms by states, however, does not necessarily mean that 
municipalities could not ban or further regulate firearm discharges 
within municipal limits; some states allow municipalities to do so.195 
Nor does the traditional regulation of firearms by states necessarily 
mean that municipalities could not ban hunting or regulate it more 
than states have done, regardless of any apparent limits on municipal 
regulation of firearms or firearm discharges—some states may only 
preempt their municipalities when it comes to regulations like 
ownership restrictions and licensing. The law on preemption is very 
unclear, principally because few states have statutes or clear judicial 
opinions on the issue; for the most part, the preemption issue is 
decided by state game departments or attorneys general after 
municipalities attempt to regulate hunting in some fashion. Thus, 
state law varies widely.196 
 
municipalities (states could also ban hunting in municipalities based on the same rationale). See, 
e.g., WEST DES MOINES, IOWA, CITY CODE § 5-2-7-5 (2003) (banning hunting generally, but  
allowing hunting of certain birds under certain conditions), available at 
http://www.sterlingcodifiers.com/IA/West%20Des%20Moines/index.htm. The desirability of 
flatly banning hunting in such a manner, however, is outside the scope of this Note. 
 194. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-11.7-103 (2003). See generally Legal Cmty. Against 
Violence, Master List of Firearms Policies, at http://www.firearmslawcenter.org (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing generally the preemption issue 
and describing each state’s applicable law). This generally means that municipalities cannot ban 
firearms or create alternative licensing schemes. Id. 
 195. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.633(a) (West 2001). 
 196. It appears that some states disallow ordinances relating to firearm discharges and 
hunting, whereas others allow them. The attorney general of Tennessee, for instance, has stated 
that, in the current absence of express state legislative authorization for municipalities to restrict 
firearm discharges within municipal limits, municipalities cannot enact ordinances restricting 
hunters from discharging firearms within city limits when such hunters are otherwise abiding by 
state hunting laws. Conflict Between State Authorized Hunting and Municipal Prohibition on 
Firearm Discharges, Op. Tenn. Att’y Gen. No. 98-038 (1998). Apparently, New Jersey forbids 
municipalities from passing ordinances that generally regulate hunting. See Aimee J. Frank, 
Animal Trapping Ban on Hold, DAILY FREEMAN (New York), Sept. 13, 2003, at A3 (describing 
how New Paltz’s town attorney advised the town that a proposed ordinance banning certain 
types of traps likely conflicted with comprehensive state hunting laws). In Vermont, 
municipalities can ban firearm discharges within municipal limits but, pursuant to the state 
constitutional provision protecting the right to hunt, municipalities cannot ban other forms of 
hunting. Isaac Olson, Town Forest to Be Posted, CALEDONIAN-RECORD (Vermont), Nov. 13, 
2003, at 1. Texas allows municipalities individually to decide whether hunting is allowed in city 
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The issue of whether and to what extent municipalities can ban 
or regulate hunting is, of course, a secondary issue; the main issue is 
whether and to what extent municipalities can create ordinances that 
require affirmative landowner consent for hunting on private land. In 
municipalities banning hunting generally, this is not an issue. In 
municipalities that could but have not yet banned hunting generally, 
it seems—although this is not certain—that they could enact this 
“lesser” restriction. In municipalities unable to ban hunting outright 
but able to regulate it, whether ordinances that further “regulate” 
hunting by requiring affirmative landowner consent would be 
considered reasonable remains an open question. Even in 
municipalities unable to ban hunting outright or in any way regulate 
it, this question remains open inasmuch as an ordinance requiring 
affirmative landowner permission to hunt could plausibly be called a 
regulation or enforcement regarding private property rights and 
trespass law, not a regulation regarding hunting.  
It is clear that any municipal ordinance would be inferior to a 
state remedy because the ordinance would only apply to one 
municipality—generally a small area when compared to a state. It 
would be time-consuming and inefficient for each individual 
municipality to try to guarantee private landowner rights. In addition, 
with the preemption issue hanging in the background, a statewide 
solution would also be preferable given the unquestionable power of 
states to change their posting statutes. Nonetheless, if state 
legislatures prove unwilling or unable to change their laws, 
municipalities can and should act. 
CONCLUSION 
Twenty-nine states currently require private landowners to post 
their land to exclude hunters, twenty-seven of these states by statute. 
The posting statutes were an outgrowth of the American desire to 
ensure that hunting was available to everyone, not just the rich and 
landed. The statutes vary widely in their particulars, but the core idea 
behind them—that landowners must take often onerous steps to 
 
limits; San Antonio allows hunting, Houston and Dallas do not. Don Sapatkin, Deer Hunters 
Quietly Active in City, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 13, 2003, at B1. The situation is similar in Iowa, 
where municipalities can ban all hunting, selectively ban certain types of hunting, and enact 
related ordinances. See, e.g., WEST DES MOINES, IOWA, CITY CODE § 5-2-7-5 (allowing hunting 
of specific birds under certain conditions but banning hunting generally and, consistent with 
Iowa state law, requiring affirmative landowner consent to hunt on private land). 
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ensure that hunters do not enter their land—exists in all twenty-seven 
statutes. Whatever the merits of these statutes when first formulated, 
as a result of social changes they now unfairly privilege hunters over 
landowners. Because judicial remedy of this problem seems unlikely, 
state legislatures should alter their statutes to require landowner 
permission to hunt on private land. Failing state legislation, 
municipalities could take action, although the reach of municipal 
ordinances would be limited and the potential for state law 
preemption presents a substantial danger. It is time for states and 
cities to recognize that American society has changed.  
